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# **The Profile of Indian Administration Before and After Independence**

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**V. SHANKAR**

Former Defence Secretary, Government of India

Former Member, Administrative Reforms Commission (India)

[ Text of two talks delivered at the Indian Institute of  
Public Administration, Maharashtra Regional Branch,  
Bombay on 18th and 19th January 1974 ]

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I need hardly say what a pleasure it is to be here this afternoon. It is always very heartening to see old familiar faces and successor faces as well, because that is what makes you realise that things are changing and the old order changes yielding place to new and if not so much God as Government fulfils itself in many ways.

When I was approached to speak to you on this subject, I hardly realised what a vast expanse of field it covered. The period before Independence can go back to the Battle of Plassey; but I do not propose to go that far. What is really material over the entire period from the eve of Independence backwards is the period since 1857 and that too not in its full historical sense but only in regard to the dominating attitude and philosophy of Government in administration and the manner in which that dominating attitude affected the broad spectrum of administration.

1857 gave a rude shock to the British and it changed their attitude in many ways not only in the sphere of administration but also in the sphere of social relationship between Indians and Europeans. What is most significant from the point of view of the subject under discussion is the attitude that was expressed in the Queen's Proclamation :

“In their prosperity shall lie our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward”.

That, to my mind, sums up the attitude of Ma-Baap Government which dominated the administration particularly at the top right

up to the time when the British Government began to think of sharing power with Indians, which idea did not demonstrate itself until Mr. Montague's Declaration of 1917. For full 60 years it was that Ma-Baap attitude of Government that dominated the entire administrative fabric and what you got from the top was really that attitude. It meant that our British rulers cared for the welfare of Indians in a very patronising sense and not so much in the materialistic sense. The Administration was intended to serve two purposes :

- 1) Keeping the interest of the British power in India dominant and
- 2) Making sure that from the point of view of the revenue administration, the Government got the revenue it needed; and from the point of view of peace and security, it was able to maintain law and order.

In the beginning for a number of years there was a predominantly British element in the Services at the top with a sprinkling of Indian element in different Provinces—selected not in India but in England. Even though the Ma-Baap attitude ruled the minds of the British rulers in India, towards the end of the 19th century a certain movement did start in England and men like Mill and Bright began to take not merely a patronising interest but a liberal interest in the goings-on in India. In 1893 the House of Commons passed a Resolution which asked for a simultaneous examination in India for entry into the ICS. The Government was, however, not bound to accept the Resolution and actually the simultaneous examinations did not come about until 1922. The Indian element in the Service was accepted in a very niggardly fashion and in a manner in which it was only to subserve the dominant spirit of the administration which I have described. The idea of sharing power with Indians was still far off; but that of participation of Indians in the administration had come about under the impact of the founding of the Congress in 1885 rather than due to any awareness of the need for the Indian element in the higher ranks of the Service. Mr. Montague's Declaration of 1917 adumbrated the idea of gradual realisation of responsible self-government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. The principle of dyarchy was also enforced at the same time, and

with the introduction of what were 'transferred subjects' came also the introduction of Indian elements in the ICS to a larger extent. Correspondingly the need was felt for having a simultaneous examination in India for entry into the ICS.

After 1920-21 the tempo of developments in the political sphere increased, particularly after the first Non-cooperation Movement. There was also at that time a realisation in the British officialdom in India as well as in the British Government at Whitehall that an increasing pace of recruitment of Indians to the Civil Service was inevitable; but that realisation did not stem so much from liberal instincts as from a shortage of personnel available for the ICS in England. After the war, there was a distinct diminution in the number of British candidates opting for service in India. The demand for our services was prompted more because of this shortage and not from any inherent recognition of the need for Indians to share the administration with their British colleagues in India. Again, the emphasis then was not on welfare or development as we know it today; but it was on keeping the administration safe for the British Government.

You will recall that the recognition of Dominion Status as the logical conclusion of the Declaration of 1917 did not come about until 1929, when Lord Irwin made his declaration after the publication of the Nehru Report. It was only in 1929 that the British realised that at one stage or the other they will have to withdraw from India and at that time there would be no option but to hand over the administration of India to Indian hands. You will find therefore that after 1929 the whole attitude of the British began to change. Whether it was at the top or in the Districts, there was an increasing realisation that one day the transfer of power will have to come. But they still thought that it would come much later than it really took place, and they continued to deal with the nationalist forces in the manner in which a foreign power determined to remain in India would deal with it. That process did not stop until 1945 when the Congress leaders were released from the Ahmednagar Jail and we had the Simla Conference. At the same time the Labour Government came into office in England and they decided that the transfer of power had to be made.

So far as the Labour Government was concerned, it was prompted by liberal instincts. They realised that Indians had to be given self-government, and if they chose, even independence. But so far as certain elements of British officialdom in India were concerned, as you will find even from Lord Wavell's Diary, they were still thinking that they might have to remain in India for another 25 years. That was on the presumption that the Congress and the Muslim League would never come to an understanding and consequently there would be so much chaos and anarchy in the country that willy-nilly the British rulers will have to stay on. Even on the eve of the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures in the winter of 1945-46, there was a thought prevalent amongst the British in India as well as in Whitehall that they might have to remain in India for 25 years more. But one thing that they did recognise was that Britain, neither financially nor from the point of view of personnel, could afford the necessary material and manpower resources to be able to govern India. In fact this was one of the important reasons that prompted the Labour Government to leave India sooner than later.

During the period from 1920 to 1947, the attitude of welfare and development on the part of Government came about in 1937, when the Congress Governments came into office. You will recall that it was under Sir James Grigg's Finance Membership that for the first time a substantial grant was made for village uplift. Before that time, expenditure on village welfare used to be a part of the general budget and there was no special allocation to the Provinces for that purpose. The Second World War stopped this process for some time; but it was again renewed. In 1944 a separate Department of Planning and Development was created in Delhi; the Member-in-charge was Sir Ardeshir Dalal and Shri H. V. R. Iyengar was the Secretary. Thus even before 1946, a beginning was made in the developmental aspects of administration; but from the point of view of the British Government it was too late. They had only about two years to go.

Upto 1920-21 there was hardly any attitude of Government manifest in the administration except that of care and maintenance and keeping the administration running, leaving the revenue to be obtained mostly from the tax on land rather than from indirect taxes like sales tax. It was only after 1920-21 that under the stress of

post-war conditions and to meet the growing expenses of government, the sphere of taxation was enlarged. Land revenue faded into comparative insignificance and other fiscal measures came into greater prominence. This had a very great impact on administration because so far the test of competence of the Indian Civil Servants used to be their capacity to administer the Districts or the Commissionerships. The Secretariat was not really so important from the point of view of the results of administration. It did lay down policies. It did lay down certain norms. But as a matter of day-to-day importance, it was the district and the divisional administration, particularly in the revenue aspect, that was dominant. Gradually, as dyarchy was introduced, the transferred subjects acquired importance but the revenue administration was still important because with it was linked law and order. The duties of the District Officer, even though less important in the overall sense than before, were still important enough to justify the attitude of the public towards him as being some sort of an overlord.

After 1937, when the Congress Governments came into office, the whole aspect changed. We got into the higher spheres of administration an element which was determined to superimpose on the administrative aspects that were dominant then, certain broader considerations from the point of view of the welfare of the people. However, as observed earlier, the Second World War provided some retardation to that process, because winning the war became more important and it necessitated the suppression of all those who interfered with the war effort, the Congress being the most important among them.

After the World War was over, there came the emphasis on the transfer of power. Everyone in the Civil Service, whether British or Indian, began to think of the future when before long India would be governed by Indians themselves. At the same time, the mental attitude of the Indians in the ICS was also undergoing a change. Upto 1921, both in mental attitude and in the style of living there was hardly any difference between the Indians in the ICS and the England-returned non-official Indians, to whatever occupation they may have belonged. You take for instance the grand-father of the Prime Minister. Upto

1920 there was hardly any difference between the way he lived and the way the Europeans lived. Before Gandhiji came on the Indian political scene, what the Indian leaders wanted was self-government for India within the Empire and not outside the Empire.

After 1921 the Indian element in the ICS began to change its attitude. It belonged to a generation which, either in schools or in colleges or in both, had shared the aspirations, the outlook and even the activities of those who were taking part in the national struggle. This process of change went on right upto 1945. When the underground movement was on in 1942-44, the schools and colleges were very much affected by it, and even in the Civil Service there were men who, in their schools and colleges, were as much inspired by national aspirations as the others who chose other occupations. The only difference was that those who chose other occupations had opportunities for active participation in the movement while those who chose the ICS had no such liberty. Yet it was inevitable that in their outlook on administration the new mental attitude should influence the Indians in the ICS and to the extent possible, they should translate that attitude into action.

This change, which was a very substantial change in outlook, came into prominence particularly after 1933. By that time we had two Congress struggles; but the 1931-33 struggle was particularly important because that was the first time when very actively the movement went into the Universities. I remember that Allahabad University could not function till after Dassera holidays because of the general upheaval in which the students of the University actively participated, unfortunately myself also without the knowledge of Government because if Government knew about it, I would not have been in the Civil Service. You had thus quite a different class of Indian intellectuals in the ICS. I deliberately use the word 'intellectual' because I think there is no gain-saying the fact that the cream of the Universities those days chose the ICS for a career except those who were so academically inclined that they were prepared to prefer scholarship to any advancement in career. With the change in the attitude of mind among the Indian ICS it was inevitable that the spirit of the administration should also change and if you could make a deep study of the tone of the administration after 1930-31 in actual field operation, you will find yourself that the attitude of the Indian elements in

the ICS was much more sympathetic to the people than the attitude of their British colleagues. Even during the 1942-44 underground struggle, the Indian officers in the Service were not so strict in dealing with the popular elements as they were in the earlier phases viz. 1920-21 or 1931-33. At any rate, there were fewer instances of excesses on the part of administration during 1942-44 than in the two earlier periods and I think there were many more officers who were inwardly sympathetic to Indian aspirations during those days than during the earlier period. By the time Independence came, we already had elements in the ICS which were prepared to cast their lot with India's future as an independent country.

After 1945, the administrative machinery of India had to cover a wide field and to tackle diverse problems. Whether it was the provision of food and clothing to the people or the control of commercial and trading activities, it became a matter of administrative concern; and the administration at all levels had to deal with many different aspects of the individual's life and activities. It had therefore to orient itself to these new functions and to acquire a new outlook. Particularly after the elections of 1946, the impact of the popular element was felt more keenly and the civil servants had to deal with a much wider sphere of problems than before. There was, however, no attempt on the part of those who were responsible for keeping the administration in trim, to train the administrators for their new tasks or for their new way of life. The administrators had therefore to train themselves or to educate themselves; and it is a tribute to the administrative machinery at all levels that, by and large, it could rise to the expectations that were formed, except perhaps in the sphere of controls.

Controls posed a very difficult problem for a country which was used for centuries mostly to being left alone. If you look at the history of Indian administration before the Second World War, you find that there were very few spheres of activity of the individual or of the community which were subjected to statutory or administrative controls. After 1945, on the other hand, both statutorily and administratively, the area of regulation and control very much widened. This was a great challenge thrown to the administrative machinery; and except in the matter of controls over commodities in which



serious shortages had to be faced, by and large, the administration acquitted itself remarkably well.

Unfortunately at this time when the administration was adapting itself to its new role, political factors intervened or supervened to increase its difficulties and to add to its problems. The post—1945 period was a period of revolutionary change in that the century-old British element in the Services had to be withdrawn and the several-decades-old partnership between the Muslim and the non-Muslim elements had also to be split up as a consequence of the decision to partition the country. Thus the administrative machinery received a very serious shock and was very substantially dented at a time when it was adapting itself to its new role of regulating the life of the community in so many different spheres. This was a change not only of degree but also of kind; a change not only in quantity but also in quality. Basically, the foundations of the administration were the same as in the old days; but in facing the administrative problems that arose after 1945 and the problems of a political character which arose out of the decision regarding transfer of power, the administrative machinery from top to bottom suffered from a psychology of uncertainty.

I think one of the severest strains to which Indian administration was subjected in its entire history was during the period from July 1945 to April 1947 i. e. just before the decision to partition the country was taken. During this period, the administration was exposed to a variety of motivations and considerations which were to some extent conflicting and in several respects controversial and which also involved a clash with some elements in politics or the other. However, we were able to survive that difficult period particularly because after September 1946 we had a leadership – at least so far as India was concerned – which was alive not only to the immensity of the tasks ahead but also to the need to keep the administrative machinery and personnel intact so as to prepare themselves for the coming change and the new responsibilities which that change would entail. But for that wise leadership at the top, the administrative machinery at all levels would have found it very difficult indeed to cope with the sea of problems with which it was faced during those very very critical months and the years that were to follow.

When the decision to partition the country was taken in May 1947 and was followed up by the 3rd June Plan, the whole atmosphere in Delhi, which was inevitably the nerve centre of the country at the time and the hub of all activities, was filled with so much apprehension, anxiety and uncertainty, that you could find all these various emotions writ large on the faces of the multiplicity of people who constituted the administrative machinery. You had the Secretariat divided against itself and you had the lower echelon of administration divided against itself. They were divided into three compartments viz. i) the British who were in any case leaving, ii) the Muslims and the non-Muslims who were going to part company and iii) the politicians at the top who were quarrelling among themselves over so many things. In spite of all these conflicting elements, it was basically due to the resilience of the administrative machinery and the inspiration provided by stable political leadership that the transfer of power was so peacefully brought about at least administratively. If there were conflicts, if there was bloodshed, if there were so many other things which really detracted from the peaceful transfer of power, it was not due to any administrative deficiencies or shortcomings; it was due to reasons even more fundamental than mere administrative considerations.

When we partitioned the country, a multiplicity of problems immediately faced the administrative machinery. We had firstly the problems of partition itself which were by and large successfully tackled in the shortest possible time on record in history. Between the 3rd of June and the 15th of August 1947, in a matter of about two months and a fortnight, we were able to solve the entire gamut of partition problems and arrangements consequential to partition. This was possible because not only was there a complete unity of purpose and perfect cohesion amongst administrative personnel at all levels in Delhi as well as in the States, but there was also united direction from the top. In Delhi, for instance, the Partition Council was headed by Sardar Patel himself and we knew very well that what he said stood against all odds and when he said something, that was a decision by which we could stand and which we could assume as unshakable. Naturally this particular feature was also translated into the States mostly under his direction. It was really a very commendable combination of political inspiration and political direction

at the top and administrative follow-up at all levels below that was responsible for a smooth transfer of power and a smooth division of assets and liabilities.

Secondly, we had to face a very serious law and order problem owing to largescale bloodshed over an area which included at least four of the present States, namely, Punjab, Western Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Rajasthan. There was also a movement of population from both sides involving millions of people. It called for the rehabilitation of people coming from the other side into India. The administrative personnel changing from one Dominion to another had also to be rehabilitated. At the same time the administrative machinery had to undertake several new responsibilities which were quite different in character from those which it had faced before the War. So far as the regulative aspects of the life of the community were concerned, these responsibilities were to some extent akin to those faced during the War; but a new emphasis on the development and welfare of the people had now been added. The new Dominion had naturally to look forward to the future and not backward to the past; it had therefore to keep in the forefront the elimination of many drawbacks with which it had charged the former British rule (viz. poverty, unemployment, industrial backwardness and a number of other problems) which in total meant taking the country forward on the road to progress and prosperity. For all this it was inevitable that we should have had a reorientation of our administrative principles and procedures so as to be able to produce a maximum of results with the minimum of labour.

During the first three years, under the stress of all these problems and the urgency of many issues that had to be solved, combined with a determined leadership and direction at the political level, we had a period of quick decisions and of sound thinking on various issues. The process of consolidation and integration went through fairly peacefully and without any dislocation and we could also lay down the lines of our future planning and advancement. But despite many attempts to put the administrative machinery into a proper state of preparation as well as suitability for further action, I think we did not make the necessary qualitative change in that machinery. By and large we persisted with old procedures and old systems with only some

improvisations here and there. The move to make qualitative changes in administrative procedures and personnel did not come about until planning made it almost compulsory to think on those lines. What really baffles me is how, despite several enquiries, commissions and committees which went into the administrative system, we always shrunk from taking far-reaching decisions which could have changed the whole character of the administrative machinery and fitted it to undertake its new responsibilities of development in a Welfare State now imposed on the administration.

In spite of these shortcomings, purely from an administrative point of view we did not give an unsatisfactory account of ourselves during at least the first three Plans. In fact, these shortcomings were not so much in evidence then as after the Third Five Year Plan was over. My own feeling is that by that time the old administrative talent had practically exhausted itself and the new administrative talent which had come into being had to face new challenges for which it was neither prepared nor even fitted. When I speak of these new challenges, I do not refer so much to administrative challenges as to challenges relating to the outlook on administration, challenges involving a gradual increase of political elements and considerations in administrative decision-making and challenges arising out of the disposition on the part of various agencies, political or otherwise to make the bureaucracy (as they called it) the scapegoat for failures in planning or failures in achievement. These tendencies gradually increased in proportion and towards the end of the Annual Plans which followed the Third Five Year Plan, there was no doubt that the administrative machinery was held up as the chief factor to be blamed for the inadequacy of achievements.

Whilst it may be that to some extent (or to a large extent, depending upon what one's individual assessment may be) the administration did fail to come up to expectations or to face the challenges that were there, it would be quite wrong to put the entire blame on the administrative machinery. Primarily the fault was in planning. We failed – and failed quite distinctly in evolving a machinery that would prepare a proper plan and not just indulge in fancies or in wishful thinking. It is failure to plan from the grassroots and from the ground that to my mind has been the main factor responsible for

failure of achievements. I say this with full sense of responsibility: and there is no better evidence of my statement than the fact that Government had to make drastic changes in the composition and role of the Planning Commission while reconstituting it for the purpose of the Fifth Five Year Plan. This fact by itself shows that the Planning Commission as it was earlier constituted and its machinery as it was then composed were substantially at fault.

Another important factor is that the age-old distinction between where the administrators began or ended and where the politicians ended or began is gradually being obliterated. Responsibility for the administration becomes a bit blurred in these circumstances: and it is easy for one element in the administrative machinery to throw the blame on the other for decisions which are called into question either in Parliament or in the public. But we have to consider the administration as an integrated whole. We cannot bring into conflict the different elements which go to constitute the entire administrative fabric. In a democracy, political elements and service elements, of whatever hierarchy or level they may be, have to work in unison and in an integrated manner for achieving the maximum results. I am afraid I cannot say that we have achieved that integration in our country. On the other hand, a greater and greater parting of ways between them is in evidence today. It is not only that the political and the administrative elements within the administrative machinery itself are not seeing eye to eye with each other and not functioning in an integrated manner, but even the politicians outside and the administrative machinery inside are not in that sympathy which could keep public opinion steady and secure public co-operation to the maximum extent possible.

We have got to realise that under the impact of the developmental philosophy and under the stress of conditions in which we are living, it is even more necessary today than it was in the past that public co-operation should be obtained to the fullest extent possible in trying to achieve administrative results. You cannot legislate against public psychology. You cannot implement policies, however sound, if the public is not prepared for them or is not in a position to understand them as being for its good. You cannot implement measures of regulation and control unless the public is

going to cooperate with you to as large an extent as possible. A good bit of what you are seeing all over the country today is because there is a conflict or lack of understanding between administrative measures and policy on the one hand and public psychology on the other.

While administrative action has necessarily to be within the framework of government's policies, the administrator has no control and no final voice over the framing of those policies. It is the political elements in a democracy who control the policies and therefore the burden of explaining the policies and of securing public cooperation for them must obviously fall on the political elements and not on the administrative machinery. Secondly, unless you have a political-administrative machinery, as in the USA, it is essential to keep the anonymity of the administrative machinery intact. The moment you make the administrative machinery a matter of public debate, it is inevitable that you take the administrator to the public and into spheres that are not strictly within the administrative field. Therefore, in a democratic set up where you have to keep the administration free from the taint of politics, it is only through the political machinery that the administrator can get into close contact with the public. In fact the task of arousing the public to the realisation of its own responsibilities and its own role falls not on the administrative machinery but on those limbs of Government which keep a liaison between the governmental machinery and the public. It is largely the deficiencies of that particular liaison machinery which are creating so many problems for our administration today.

Take a country like the UK. Of course, I recognise that it is a country with an administrative unity, unlike India where we have an administration broken up into so many compartments—Central, State and Local. But at the same time you have this fact there—a very prominent fact — that there is a perfect liaison between the political parties which constitute the democratic set up and the people, through the party machinery, which is effective and which is responsible not only for taking matters from the governmental level to the people but also from the people to the governmental level. Much more in the present conditions than under the normal democratic

functioning in the past, is it necessary for our country to have such an effective liaison machinery to create an awareness among the people about government's policies and to foster amongst them a feeling of cooperation and an attitude of helpfulness. Further, our country with its vastness, its heterogeneity and its illiteracy, backwardness and poverty, needs such a liaison machinery even more than the more advanced countries. Today if our administration has to justify itself so much, it is because of a lack of rapport between the decision-making administrative machinery and the people for whom those decisions are taken. How to bring about this rapport should be one of the most important assignments that any agency charged with making administrative improvements in India must face. It is a problem that cannot be solved without a willingness on the part of the political elements to subject themselves to the same sort of heart-searching which they want to impose upon the administrative machinery. They must do a lot of heart-searching themselves and they must agree to somebody else also searching their hearts for purposes similar to those for which they would like the administrative machinery to be subjected to a search of hearts. If that is not done a very important ingredient for making the administration successful would be absent and inevitably the results would be diluted.

I would like to stress one other factor which has to be faced from the point of view of public psychology. We must recognise that today the area of enlightenment is growing and it has become almost global. What happens in one corner of the globe is made known to other corners through various media of publicity. Whether the society in India is educated or uneducated, whether a particular community is advanced or backward, they all know today how other countries are advancing and forging ahead probably better than us. They are not therefore going to take our administrative deficiencies or unsoundness for granted; they are not going to submit to them as willingly as they did before – a willingness which was made akin to pathetic contentment. It is no longer pathetic contentment but tragic discontent which is going to face our administrative machinery. Whether it is the popular or political element of this machinery or whether it is the administrative services in the different hierarchies and classes – all of them are going to suffer from that tragic discontent, unless we are

able to take steps to mitigate that discontent in the shortest possible time. But it is not easy to do so, because this discontent is economic and materialistic and solutions for it cannot be found overnight; they have to be found only over a period of time. It is therefore necessary that administratively we progress not in arithmetical progression but in geometrical progression and the results that we produce for the betterment of the people are such as can give them at least some measure of satisfaction that would keep the rest of their discontent somewhat dormant. Otherwise the danger is that the contentment or satisfaction that the administrative machinery offers would not be of such dimensions as can contain the rest of the discontent which would be aroused by seeing other people advancing much more than they, though they had the same problems to face. They would not then be such silent spectators of a progressive deterioration as they had been in the past.

The current trends in our country are extremely unhealthy. You have discontent breaking into disturbances; and you have political elements trying to escape their responsibilities. Problems which should be solved peacefully are getting into the arena of complications and conflict. You have therefore to be very careful in evolving solutions for the troubles that afflict the people. Ultimately when the rule of law or the demands of peace are not satisfactorily met in a vast country like India where obviously the proportion of those who administer the law to those for whom the law is administered is very much smaller than in other countries, or in other words where your administrative machinery considering the vast area of the country and the vast numbers of the population is sparse, the problem becomes almost insurmountable. Consequently, it is even more necessary that on the one side there should be a complete trust between the political elements and the administrative elements in government and on the other side there should be a complete rapport between the political elements and the people. Without that it will be impossible to forecast for this country a peaceful and smooth progress towards the goal of a Welfare State which has become more or less the loadstar of our governmental policies and our planning targets.

I have deliberately not gone into the details of administrative changes that would inevitably follow from the various considerations



that I have urged before you. To do that would need much more time than is at my disposal. But about one thing I feel very strongly, namely that there should be an end to the shifting of responsibilities, an end to witch-hunting and an end to mutual mud-slinging between the different elements of administration. It goes without saying that at least for a period of the next twenty to twenty-five years there has to be an atmosphere of truce and if possible of peace between the different elements that constitute our functional elements. Unless we have a complete unity of thought and purpose in the entire fabric of our administration - whether it is at the ministerial level or at the civil service level, whether it is in the higher echelons of the Service or in the lower rungs - we shall not be able to solve the tremendous problems that face our country.

As a result of our efforts over the last 25 years, our per capita income - which is by and large the general index of a country's progress in the economic sphere - has increased from about Rs. 279 to only about Rs. 309 at the same 1948-49 price level. On the other hand, what you really need today to give a minimum standard of living to the people is a per capita income of Rs. 1,000. You can therefore realise the vast gap that separates the poverty of the people from the prosperity that is their due. It is 1 : 3. If we have failed to bridge this gap in 25 years, what are we going to achieve in the next 25 years? In the next 25 years we should not be only at Rs. 1,000 per head; we should be somewhere near Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 per capita. Whether this vast country, with its growing population and with resources which we have failed fully to exploit in the last 25 years, can ever achieve that measure of progress to which our people are entitled, is a matter on which I would not like to speculate. I would only cite this to indicate the seriousness of the problem that faces us not only today but in the next 25 years. It is a task which faces the planners and the administrators and the politicians of today in the interests of the future of our country.



